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Abstract 
The recent decline in funding levels of defined benefit pension plans (DBPs) has attracted the 
attention of regulators in Australia and other jurisdictions. In light of such scrutiny, this study 
provides timely empirical evidence of the economic and regulatory implications of the recent 
change in the financial position of DBPs sponsored by Australian listed companies. We 
identify that over the four-year period from 2000 to 2003 the frequencies of both accrued 
benefits deficits and vested benefits deficits increased sharply after 2001. Coinciding with the 
increased incidence of deficits, the time lag in measuring accrued and vested benefits 
declined significantly. Controlling for firms taking contribution holidays, we find that the 
market prices vested benefits surpluses and deficits, and accrued benefits deficits, but not 
accrued benefits surpluses. This asymmetric treatment of firms’ superannuation funding 
positions is consistent with accounting conservatism theories and, as a consequence, has 
implications for recent adoption of IFRS accounting standards requiring Australian 
companies to recognise both accrued benefits surpluses and deficits.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent international concerns about the rapid change in defined benefit pension plans (DBPs) 
from surpluses to deficits has led to a renewed interest in the social, economic, and 
accounting implications of unfunded pension plans.1 Across major OECD countries, the steep 
decline in DBP funding levels has been attributed to a combination of low interest rates and 
poor equity market returns, following the long stock-market boom of the 1990s (Yermo, 
2003). A survey by Watson Wyatt (cited in Yermo, 2003) revealed that the median funding 
ratio2 for U.S. DBPs declined from 125% in 1999 to 99% in 2001 and the percentage of 
underfunded plans increased from 18% to 52% over the same period. By 2003, the 
percentage of underfunded U.S. plans rose to 72.6% with total deficits of $312 billion, 
(Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 2006) with substantial deficits continuing, despite 
the 2003 market rally (Bader, 2004) . In the U.K., total pension deficits were estimated to be 
£160 billion in 2002,3 although deficits for the FTSE 100 firms halved from £100 to £50 in 
2003 with the strong growth in equity markets.4  In Australia, deficits were estimated to be 
not as substantial due to the smaller number of defined benefit funds, tighter investment 
regulations, and the better performing Australian equity market (Davis, 2003). Nevertheless, 
specific instances of major shortfalls were identified in the financial media.5   
The most evident response to funding concerns has been by corporate regulators. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) placed the review of the international 
accounting standard for employee benefits (IAS 19) on its agenda in 2003. The U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued an exposure draft in September 2003 
to address disclosure inadequacies in annual and interim reports (FASB, 2003a). The FASB 
also announced that it was considering a joint project with the IASB to address claimed 
inadequacies in current rules for the measurement and recognition of pension assets and 
obligations (FASB, 2003b). Of major concern is the ‘corridor approach’ permitted in both 
international and U.S. accounting standards.6 Critics of this method claim that it permits 
companies to artificially boost earnings during market downturns leading to misvalued 
corporate equities (see Coronado and Sharpe, 2003). Australian regulators also responded to 
concerns about declining funding levels in defined benefit superannuation funds. During 
2003, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) conducted a “health check” on 
DBP solvency levels, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
surveyed companies to assess the adequacy of reporting and disclosure of DBP commitments 
by corporate sponsors, and the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) reaffirmed 
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the need for companies to provide current and informative disclosures about any 
underfunding of DBPs (see AASB, 2003).  
In contrast to the media attention and regulators’ responses to the deficit positions of many 
corporate DBPs, there has been little attention on how market participants and the 
management of companies sponsoring DBPs have reacted to the new environment. Research 
on these reactions is important as it can potentially inform the regulatory debate. With this 
motivation in mind, this study seeks to provide empirical evidence of the economic 
implications of the recent change in the financial position of DBPs sponsored by Australian 
listed companies. 
We focus on Australian DBPs for several reasons. First, in comparison with many other 
jurisdictions, the Australian accounting standard AASB 1028 required companies to only 
disclose superannuation assets and liabilities and did not prescribe any recognition or 
measurement requirements; the latter issue was intended to be subject to a revision pending a 
public hearing and further deliberations (AASB 1028, preface). No such revision occurred 
until the move to converge with international accounting standards in 2005. Second, the 
Australian measurement rules for accrued benefits differ from their international counterparts 
with respect to valuation frequencies. Third, while many U.S. DBPs had net deficit positions, 
prior to 2002 most Australian DBPs operated with net surplus positions (Ang et al, 1999; 
Gallery, 2003).  
These institutional differences may result in superannuation assets and liabilities being 
treated differently by managers in Australian company accounts and valued differently by 
investors, relative to other jurisdictions.  Indeed, a common argument presented against the 
immediate recognition method was that the resulting disclosures would not be useful to 
market participants (see Ang et al, 2000).  Some early evidence suggests that this may be the 
case; while Ang et al (1999) show that in the first year after the introduction of AASB 1028 
Employee Benefits superannuation disclosures were priced by the market, this result is limited 
to only firms in the industrial sector. 
 We revisit the value-relevance issue in a more recent time period (2000 to 2003); one in 
which the economic environment has changed dramatically from when AASB 1028 became 
effective in 1995. Specifically, we examine the changing nature of DBP surpluses and 
deficits, and test the value relevance of superannuation funding positions that contain an 
increasingly larger proportion of deficits. Controlling for firms taking contribution holidays, 
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we find that the market prices vested benefits surpluses and deficits, and accrued benefits 
deficits, but not accrued benefits surpluses. This latter finding is consistent with theoretical 
arguments in the accounting conservatism literature relating to the asymmetrical treatment of 
gains and loses (see Watts, 2003a and 2003b).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
Australian institutional setting for DBPs and the accounting regulations for DBPs. Evidence 
on the value relevance of the DBP disclosures is presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents 
the research design, Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and the paper concludes in 
Section 6. 
2. AUSTRALIAN DBPS AND THE REPORTING ENVIRONMENT 
Superannuation arrangements between employers and employees can take the form of either 
a defined contribution plan (DCP) or a defined benefit plan (DBP).  Under a DCP the 
employer pays fixed contributions to a superannuation fund. The benefits accruing to 
members in the fund comprise the sum of the contributions plus earnings on accumulated 
assets. An employer’s obligations are discharged on payment of contributions to the DCP; 
employees bear the investment risk and the actuarial risk of insufficient assets to pay benefits. 
Under a defined benefit plan (DBP) the employee’s benefit is usually determined as a 
multiple of the employee’s final salary and years of service. Employers fund this promised 
benefit through periodic contributions to a superannuation fund. An actuary periodically 
reviews the contribution rate and the extent to which assets held in the superannuation fund 
are adequate to meet the obligation to pay benefits. If the fund is in deficit because, for 
example, returns on assets held in the superannuation fund are lower than expected, the 
employer has an obligation to make good the shortfall by making additional contributions to 
the fund; thus, employers sponsoring DBPs bear the investment and actuarial risks.  
Accounting for DCP obligations in the employer’s accounts is straightforward in that an 
expense is recognised as the superannuation contribution amounts are accrued and paid. Once 
the accrued contributions have been paid to the superannuation fund, the liability is 
extinguished. In contrast, accounting for DBP obligations is complex because the obligation 
is measured using actuarial techniques. In the measurement process, actuarial gains and 
losses arise due to differences between the actuarial assumptions that were made in the past 
and actual outcomes, as well as changes in actuarial assumptions. In addition, the obligation 
is measured on a discounted basis because the benefit payments will not be required until 
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many years in the future. In this context, the question of how to determine the amount of 
superannuation expense and any liability or asset that should be recognised each period in 
employers’ accounts, has been a much-debated issue both in Australia and overseas 
jurisdictions.  
U.S. standard setters were the first to issue a comprehensive pension accounting standard. 
While the FASB initially proposed to issue a standard which would have recognised all 
actuarial gains and losses immediately in income and the excess (shortfall) of plan assets over 
obligations as assets (liabilities) (see FASB 1983), objections from constituents led to the 
FASB issuing a standard with many compromises. SFAS 87 allows smoothing of the pension 
expense whereby actuarial gains and losses are recognised over a period of time. Also, if the 
DBP is in deficit, only a ‘minimum liability’ is recognised, which does not take into account 
the amount of the full obligation. SFAS 87 does not permit recognition of an asset where the 
DBP is in surplus.  
The Australian standard setters attempted to follow the US standard setters’ initial 
conceptually ‘pure’ approach and issued the exposure draft ED 53 Accounting for Employee 
Entitlements in August 1991, proposing recognition of any superannuation surplus (deficit) as 
an asset (liability), and recognition of the change in the DBP superannuation asset/liability 
during the period as an expense. The AASB backed down on this proposal following intense 
corporate lobbying (see Ang et al. 2000) and issued AASB 1028 Accounting for Employee 
Entitlements, requiring only disclosure of superannuation information relating to DBPs 
sponsored by the company; the issues of measurement and recognition were deferred and 
were to be addressed by the AASB at a later date (see Preface to AASB 1028).  
Starting from 30 June 1995, companies were required to disclose information about the 
defined benefit superannuation funds they sponsor. AASB 1028 (para.6.10) required that the 
information be sourced from the most recent financial report of each superannuation fund 
sponsored by the firm.7  Key superannuation disclosures prescribed by AASB 1028 (para. 
6.10) include:  
• Net market value of plan assets;  
• Vested benefits;8  
• Accrued benefits;9   
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• Fund surplus or deficit, measured as accrued benefits less net market value of plan 
assets; and 
• Details of dates at which the amounts required to be disclosed were measured, the 
employers’ superannuation accounting policies, and any amounts recognised in the 
accounts.  
Measurement of vested benefits is relatively straightforward as this is the amount members 
would receive if they left the plan at reporting date. However, determining accrued benefits is 
more complex as actuarial assumptions and valuations need to be applied in the measurement 
process. AAS 25 (para.50) requires measurement of accrued benefits as part of each 
comprehensive actuarial review of the plan, which is conducted at least every three years.10  
Where the maximum three-year period is used, the disclosed amount of accrued benefits in 
the sponsoring firm’s annual report can be up to four years old.11  
The usefulness of disclosures about companies’ superannuation obligations resulting from 
these measurement and reporting lags has been questioned (see Ang et al, 1999; Ang et al, 
2000; and Gallery, 2003). While this apparent inadequacy in reporting of superannuation 
obligations seems to have been tolerated during the 1990s, the situation changed dramatically 
with the recent market downturn in 2000 and 2001. In March 2003, Australian and 
international concerns about the implications of DBP deficits prompted the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority to conduct a “health check” to assess DBP solvency. 
Although most funds remained solvent, APRA identified areas of superannuation legislation 
which could be strengthened to ensure DBPs are appropriately funded.12 Shortly afterwards, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) commenced a survey in 
conjunction with Corporate Superannuation Association Inc (CSA) to assess the adequacy of 
reporting and disclosure of DBP commitments by corporate sponsors.13 Following the 
survey, ASIC indicated it would include DBP reporting and disclosure in its 2003/04 
financial reporting surveillance program. In a contentious statement, ASIC indicated it 
expected companies to recognise deficits in their financial statements, despite the fact that the 
current Australian standard (AASB 1028) mandates disclosure only and is silent on 
recognition.14 Sensing the urgency of the issue, the AASB issued a media release in June 
2003,15 and Urgent Issues Group Abstract 54 in August 2003, reaffirming the AASB 1028 
disclosure requirements. Although the AASB did not insist on the immediate recognition of 
deficits, the Board emphasised the need for companies to provide current and informative 
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disclosures about any underfunding of DBPs. Nevertheless, subsequent events suggest that 
the AASB prefers immediate recognition.  
As part of the program of convergence to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
the AASB undertook to issue an accounting standard that mirrors IAS 19 Employee Benefits. 
The pre-2004 version of IAS 19 had similar pension plan measurement and recognition 
provisions as the US standard SFAS 87, notably allowing the smoothing of pension expense 
through the use of the ‘corridor’ approach of recognising actuarial gains and losses. In April 
2004 the IASB issued “Exposure Draft of Proposed Amendments to IAS 19 Employee 
Benefits – Actuarial Gains and Losses, Group Plans and Disclosures”, which included a 
proposal to allow three methods of recognising actuarial gains and losses: the corridor 
approach, immediate recognition in profit or loss, or recognition directly in equity. The 
AASB concurrently issued exposure draft ED 131 “Request for Comment on IASB ED 
Proposed Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits: Actuarial Gains and Losses, Group 
Plans and Disclosures”. Controversially, ED 131 proposed not to allow the three options to 
account for actuarial gains and losses as per the IASB proposal, but instead proposed 
immediate recognition of actuarial gains and losses. The AASB gave three reasons for this 
surprising departure from IFRSs: (1) allowing the other two options would be inconsistent 
with the objective of reporting comparability; (2) it would be inappropriate to recognise 
actuarial gains and losses in retained earnings because they meet the conceptual framework 
definitions of income and expense and therefore should be recognised in earnings; and (3) 
“full recognition of actuarial gains and losses in the income statement provides greater 
transparency than both the corridor approach and the direct to retained earnings option” (ED 
131, p.v). The AASB also stated that it expects “the IASB will reconsider the treatment of 
actuarial gains and losses as part of its long-term post-employment benefits project”, 
suggesting the AASB anticipated the ‘undesirable’ options would be eliminated from IAS 19 
some time in the future. Accordingly, AASB 119 Employee Benefits was issued in July 2004 
with the requirement for immediate recognition in income of all actuarial gains and losses.  
However, just a few weeks after IAS 19 was reissued in mid-December 2004, allowing the 
three options for treating actuarial gains and losses, the AASB unexpectedly reissued AASB 
119 allowing the same three options. The AASB stated that while immediate recognition is 
the most conceptually sound option, inclusion of the other two options in IAS 19 “creates 
uncertainty about the direction that the IASB will take on this issue in IAS 19 in the future” 
(AASB, 2004b).   
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Notwithstanding changes to treatments for recognition of superannuation costs, AASB 119 
and IAS 19 have consistently required any superannuation surplus or deficit to be recognised 
in the balance sheet as an asset or liability. This requirement represents a significant change 
from the disclosure-only requirement of AASB 1028. Whether superannuation surpluses and 
deficits are treated as assets and liabilities by investors and other users of financial reports has 
been the subject of considerable debate. Also, the empirical evidence, most of which is 
provided in the value relevance literature, is mixed.  
3. VALUE RELEVANCE OF PENSION OBLIGATIONS 
Prior to the introduction of AASB 1028 in 1995, few Australian firms voluntarily disclosed 
information about superannuation obligations, apart from a general statement about solvency 
levels. Despite the widespread corporate use of DBPs, the culture of non-disclosure hindered 
research on capital market effects of companies’ superannuation obligations.16  In contrast, a 
large body of international research, dominated by U.S. studies, has accumulated over the last 
three decades. Much of this research is related to, or followed the introduction of SFAS 87 
Employers' Accounting for Pensions in 1985.    
Notable valuation-based research on pension disclosures includes Daley (1984), Dhaliwal 
(1986), Landsman (1986), Maher (1987), Barth (1991), and Barth, Beaver and Landsman 
(1992). Collectively, the findings indicate the unrecognised pension assets and liabilities (as 
reported in note disclosures) are priced by the market in the same way as recognised assets 
and liabilities of the firm. That is, the market considers pension assets and obligations as 
belonging to the employer sponsor of the pension plan. Additionally, Barth (1991) observes 
various components of pension disclosures are priced by the market. In particular, she finds 
that market participants include disclosures that incorporate expectations about future salary 
progression (projected benefit obligations, or accrued benefit obligations in the Australian 
context) in market valuations. Of particular interest to our study, Maher (1987) finds that 
investors appear to treat firms’ net funding positions asymmetrically, in that pension 
disclosures of firms with net asset positions (surpluses) are less significant in explaining 
market valuations than the disclosures of firms with net liability positions (deficits).   
Ang et al (1999) attempt to replicate the U.S. findings in the Australian context. They 
investigate the value relevance of superannuation disclosures required by AASB 1028 in the 
first applicable year of the standard (1995). Similar to U.S. findings, they find superannuation 
obligations are priced by the market, but only for firms in the industrial sector. Contrary to 
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U.S. evidence, their results suggest that market participants do not place greater weight on 
accrued benefits, as opposed to vested benefits. Also, unlike the findings of Landsman 
(1986), they find the market does not place higher weights on the superannuation items than 
recognised assets and liabilities. Ang et al (1999) offer a number of possible explanations for 
the observed differences. First, institutional differences in the measurement and reporting of 
accrued benefits, such as dated valuations of accrued benefits, may decrease the relevance of 
accrued benefits disclosures.17  They argue that the assumptions underlying the determination 
of accrued benefits can change dramatically and become dated with minor variations in 
salaries, workforce levels, and interest rates, or market returns on investments. The flexibility 
of being allowed to choose the frequency of actuarial reviews within three-year periods also 
provides the opportunity for managers to time valuations to minimise the disclosed accrued 
liability. Second, market participants may have inappropriately discounted the DBP 
disclosures until they had become more salient and better understood by the investing 
community.18 Finally, measurement error and the possibility of omitted variables from their 
balance sheet-based valuation models may have led to incorrect inferences.  
One important assumption in relation to value-relevance research is that the findings are 
generalisable across time periods.19 While Ang et al. (1999) use 1995 data, most of the U.S. 
research is based on 1980s data. In the Ang et al. sample all but one firm had DBPs with a net 
surplus position. In a more recent U.S. study, Coronado and Sharpe (2003) use data from 
1993 to 2001 and provide evidence inconsistent with the earlier U.S. findings. They test two 
alternative models of pension valuation: the ‘transparent’ model and the ‘opaque’ model. 
Under the transparent model, “investors gauge the contribution of a pension plan to the 
sponsoring firm’s value by looking at the plan’s marked-to-market net asset value” 
(Coronado and Sharpe, 2003, p.1), as disclosed in notes to the financial statements. The 
opaque model (as first proposed by Gold, 2000) is a more naïve approach that focuses only 
on the recognised items in the income statement and “presumes the market’s assessment of 
net pension value is driven instead by the pension accruals” (Coronado and Sharpe, 2003, 
p.1). Coronado and Sharpe’s (2003) findings suggest the opaque model dominates and as a 
result of pension-induced errors, firms were on average overvalued by two to three 
percentage points during the late 1990s, and such overvaluations rose to 10 percent by the 
end of 2001. They conclude that complicated pension numbers (derived in accordance with 
SFAS 87) included in bottom-line profit in the 1990s created distortions in market values of 
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equity. They argue that their findings support calls for revisions to the pension accounting 
standard (SFAS 87) to incorporate the mark-to-market (immediate recognition) approach.   
Another important assumption in value relevance research, particularly earlier studies, is that 
the market reacts uniformly to gains and losses. However, this assumption may not hold in 
circumstances where losses are more transitory than gains (Hayn, 1995; Collins et al, 1999), 
and where managers adopt conservative policies with respect to reporting of losses (Watts, 
2003a and 2003b).  In a study of the value relevance of pension disclosures by Canadian 
firms for the years 2000 and 2001, Wiedman and Weir (2004) find that investors view 
underfunded plans as liabilities of the sponsoring company, but overfunded plans do not 
appear to be considered assets of the sponsoring firms. They suggest that this differential 
pricing of pension deficits and surpluses reflects the legal constraints on Canadian firms in 
relation to withdrawing surpluses from pension plans.  
Overall, the US research shows that DBP assets and liabilities (including obligations that 
incorporate expectations about future salary progression) are priced by the market. In the 
Australian context, the findings of Ang et al. (1999) suggest that the less onerous Australian 
accounting rules for DBPs and sponsoring firms may have led to disclosures with lower 
information quality than those produced by their U.S. counterparts. If this is the case, it is 
expected that the DBP obligations disclosed by Australian firms will contain less value-
relevant information. However, the value relevance of disclosed pensions assets and 
liabilities may have altered over time with changing market conditions and recent attempts to 
improve the information quality and transparency of financial reporting. In particular, the 
downturn in equity markets in 2000 and 2001 and the rapid increase in the number of DBPs’ 
deficit positions are likely to have refocused attention on the financial implications of DBP 
obligations. Additionally, the recent action by regulators and the adoption of the international 
accounting standard is likely to have impacted the decisions of managers and investors with 
respect to DBPs. Consistent with the conservatism literature, mangers are also expected to 
adopt conservative policies with respect to reporting superannuation deficits. For these 
reasons we predict that as DBP funding levels declined, superannuation assets (surpluses) and 
liabilities (deficits) became more value relevant to investors.  
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Sample 
The sample used in this study is based on the 120, Top-500 companies sponsoring one or 
more defined benefit plans in 1999, as identified by Gallery (2003). The study period covers 
the four-year period from 2000 to 2003; the year 2000 was chosen as the starting point as it 
predates the decline in equity markets. The Connect-4 and Aspect/Huntleys Dat Analysis 
databases were searched for annual reports of the 120 companies in each of the four years; 
the search identified that 22 companies delisted and 15 had wound up their sponsored DBPs. 
A further 13 companies did not disclose all or some of the superannuation information (i.e., 
did not comply with AASB 1028) and due to these missing data were dropped from the 
sample. The final sample comprises 336 firm-year observations. The distribution of 
observations across industries and years is presented in Table 1 and shows wide dispersion 
across industries, with no particular industry dominating the sample.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
For each of the 336 observations, superannuation data were hand-collected from note 
disclosures in the companies’ annual financial reports, comprising: amounts of accrued 
benefits (AB), vested benefits (VB), net market value of plan assets (NMVPA) and 
contributions to defined benefit plans; and the dates at which each of AB, VB and NMVPA 
were measured. About 40% of the sample companies sponsor more than one DBP; for these 
companies, where the dates at which each of the plans’ assets and liabilities differ, the date 
used is that of the largest plan sponsored by the company. Share price data are extracted from 
the CRIF SPPR database, using the closing price four months after the company’s balance 
date. The company assets, liabilities and earnings data are sourced from the Aspect/Huntleys 
Fin Analysis database.  
4.2 Measuring Value Relevance - Empirical Models  
Value-relevance studies examine “the association between a security price-based dependent 
variable and a set of accounting variables”; if an accounting number is significantly related to 
the dependent variable, then it is regarded as value relevant (Beaver, 2002, p.459). The 
theoretical foundation of value-relevance research lies in the combination of valuation theory 
and the accounting contextual arguments that allow predictions about how accounting 
variables relate to the market value of equity (Beaver, 2002). While a large body of literature 
has examined the relation between market values of equity and accounting numbers, a 
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common criticism has been the mis-specification of valuation models.20 Early pension 
studies, such as Daley (1994), used an earnings-based approach. Subsequent studies adopted 
a balance-sheet approach (e.g. Landsman, 1986; Barth, 1991; and Ang et al., 1999). More 
recent value relevance studies employ a valuation model based on the modelling of Ohlson 
(1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995). The Feltham-Ohlson model shows that the market 
value of a firm can be written as a function of the book values of equity and earnings. Book 
value proxies for expected future ‘normal’ earnings while accounting earnings are included in 
the model to capture information about asset and liability values not currently recognised in 
financial statement items (Barth, 2000). That is, net income serves as a proxy for the 
abnormal earnings variable omitted from an accounting balance sheet model (Barth and 
Landsman, 1995). However, because negative earnings are typically not informative about 
future earnings (Hayn, 1995; Collins, Pincus & Xie, 1999), a more recent refinement is to 
include a control for loss-making firms in the application of Feltham-Ohlson-based models.  
Consistent with this recent refinement, our model specified in (1) includes market value of 
equity (MVE) as a summary measure of information relevant to investors, book value of 
equity (BVE) and net income (NI) are accounting summary measures of information expected 
to be reflected in MVE, and a control (LOSS) is included for loss-making firms, together with 
the interaction term LOSSxNI.   
MVEi,t = α0 + α1BVEi,t +  α2NIi,t + α3LOSSi,t + α4 LOSSxNIi,t  + εi,t   (1)   
 
Superannuation variables are added to Model (1) with vested benefit variables entering 
Model 2 and accrued benefit variables entering Model 3. The net superannuation surplus or 
deficit relating to vested benefits is represented by VBSurpDef and ABSurpDef for accrued 
benefits. These variables are measured as net plan assets minus the relevant benefits 
obligation. To test whether the market prices surpluses and deficits differently, the dummy 
variables VBDEF and ABDEF enter each of the models, coded one if the observation is a 
deficit and zero otherwise. The variable CH1999 is also included in Models (2) and (3) to 
control for firms that were taking a contribution holiday in 1999,21 the year immediately prior 
to the commencement of the study period. Because the measurement lag can be up to three 
years, firms taking a contribution holiday are likely to have delayed resumption of 
contributing to the superannuation fund until the next full actuarial review had been 
conducted, by which time economy-wide effects may have already pushed the 
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superannuation funding position significantly downwards. CH1999 is likely to proxy for 
poorer information quality in DBP disclosures and is therefore expected to be viewed 
negatively by the market. A small number of sample firms recognise some or all their net 
surpluses or deficits. Therefore, to ensure that BVE and NI are before any recognised 
superannuation items we deduct the related recognised amounts to form the variables 
BVEBRS and NIBRS, repsectively.   
MVEi,t = α0 + α1BVEBRSi,t + α2NIBRSi,t + α3LOSSi,t + α4LOSS×NIBRSi,t + α5 VBSurpDef i,t +  
α6VBDEFi,t + α7CH1999i,t + εi,t        (2) 
 
MVEi,t = α0 + α1BVEBRSi,t + α2NIBRSi,t + α3LOSSi,t + α4LOSS×NIBRSi,t + α5 ABSurpDef i,t +  
α6ABDEFi,t + α7CH1999i,t + εi,t        (3) 
     
All of the financial variables are measured on a per share basis to mitigate problems 
associated with size-induced heteroscedasticity.22  Reported t-statistics are based on White’s 
(1980) heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. Pooling cross-sectional time series data 
has the potential to violate the underlying assumption of regression analysis as to 
independence of the observations. We therefore use a panel data-based regression approach. 
Results of a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the panel data set used in this study revealed 
that a random effects regression model should be used. Accordingly, to control for time-
specific effects (Greene, 2000), we report our results from estimating a (two-way) random 
effects rather than the classical regression model.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 336 firm-year observations. Panel A 
of Table 2 shows firm size, as measured by market capitalisation, ranges from $14.3 million 
to $51,550.1 million, with a median of $1,524.7 million. Although the magnitudes of the 
superannuation variables are relatively much smaller, there is wide dispersion in the 
superannuation funding position across the test sample. The accrued benefits funding position 
ranges from a deficit of $1,293 million to a surplus of $5,246 million, and vested benefits 
ranges between a $671 million deficit and a $7,968 million surplus; the median values are 
positive, indicating that most of the firm-year observations have surpluses.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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Panel A of Table 2 also shows the measurement lag for accrued benefits (AB) and vested 
benefits (VB), represented by the number of days since the item was measured. The median 
of 275 days for VB shows that for half of the firm-year observations VB were measured at a 
date nine or more months prior to the firm-year balance date.23  Recall that accrued benefits 
are required to be actuarially reviewed at least every three years. The median of 366 days for 
AB indicates that the measurement lag is more than one year for half of the firm-years in the 
sample, more than two years old for another 25% of firm-year observations, and the 
maximum firm-year observation is four years (1461 days) old. Relative to vested benefits, the 
longer time-lag for accrued benefits suggests it is a less relevant measure of superannuation 
obligations than vested benefits.  
Table 2, Panel C shows the frequencies for the four dichotomous variables used in the 
analysis, and shows forty-two (12.5%) of the observations have negative earnings (LOSS), 
about half of the firms were taking a contribution holiday in 1999 (CH1999), 82 (24.4%) of 
the firm-years had an accrued benefits deficit (ABDEF), and 61 (18%) had a vested benefits 
deficit (VBDEF). The higher incidence of ABDEF than VBDEF is because accrued benefits, 
which incorporate projected benefits, are usually a larger amount than vested benefits.  
To explore whether firms which were taking a contribution holiday in 1999 (when almost all 
sample firms reported superannuation surpluses) are more likely to have superannuation 
deficits during the study period, ABDEF and VBDEF are cross-tabulated with CH1999 for 
each of the four years in the study period; the results are presented in Table 3. For VBDEF, 
Table 3 shows that only four (4%) companies had vested benefits superannuation deficits in 
each of 2000 and 2001, but this number sharply increased to 19 in 2002 and then almost 
doubled to 34 (47%) in 2003; a similar pattern is evident for ABDEF with only eight (8%) 
firms reporting deficits in 2000, increasing to 43 (60%) in 2003. In each of the four years, the 
incidence of firms with vested benefits deficits and taking a contribution holiday in 1999 is 
consistently higher than those that did not take a contribution holiday. This difference is 
statistically significant for 2003 (χ2 = 3.567, p = 0.059) and all firm-years (χ2 = 4.954, p = 
0.026). In contrast, the firm-year observations for accrued benefits deficits are about evenly 
split between those that took a contribution holiday and those that did not. The results for 
vested benefits support the proposition that firms that had been taking a contribution holiday 
were slower in responding to the decline in funding levels of the superannuation funds they 
sponsor. The difference in behaviour of firms that were taking a contribution holiday in 1999 
supports the need to control for these firms in our value relevance analysis.   
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
By disclosing superannuation information that is often dated by one year or more, the 
information about superannuation obligations in company financial reports may be 
misleading. To assess the impact of the time lags in reported superannuation information, 
tests were conducted for differences between the means of the time lags for firm-years with 
deficits and those without. The results presented in Table 4 show that for firm-years with 
deficits, the mean age of the accrued benefits information is 384 days, compared to 550 days 
for the no-deficit observations, and the mean difference is significant (t = 3.475, p < 0.01). 
Similarly, the mean age of the vested benefits information for firm-years with deficits is 150 
days versus 313 days for no-deficit observations. Consistent with a conservative bias by 
managers, these results suggest that both accrued and vested benefits disclosures tend to 
become timelier when a DBP’s net position is a deficit.   
Tests are also conducted to explore whether the time lag reduced in the more recent period, 
when funding levels dropped and more deficits occurred; results are presented in Table 5. 
The VB lag, on average, declined from 312 days during the 2000 to 2001 period, to 247 days 
during the 2002 to 2003 period;  the mean difference is statistically significant (t = 2.226, p < 
0.05). Similarly, the AB lag declined over the period from a mean of 530 days to 485 days 
but the mean difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. These results 
indicate that as superannuation funding levels declined in the 2002 to 2003 period, firms 
generally disclosed more up-to-date vested benefit information than they had in 2000 and 
2001. The absence of such a change for accrued benefits is perhaps explained by the 
frequencies of actuarial valuations generally continuing to be conducted only every three 
years. Taken together, the Table 4 and 5 results suggest that vested benefits are likely to have 
become more value relevant in the recent period because the VB measurement lag has on 
average declined significantly more than the AB measurement lag.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
Our regression models are used to test the extent to which the superannuation information is 
relevant to the market. Table 6, Panel A shows the results from estimating the basic model 
prior to incorporating the superannuation variables (Model 1), and the expanded model with 
variables relating to vested benefits entering Model (2) and accrued benefits variables 
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entering Model (3). Consistent with expectations, the Model (1) results show that the book 
value of equity (BVE) is positive and significant. Also as expected, earnings (NI) are 
positively associated with firm value, and the interaction variable between earnings and the 
loss dummy (LOSSXNI) is negative and significant.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Models (2) and (3) test the value relevance of vested benefits surpluses/deficits and accrued 
benefits surpluses/deficits, with VBSurpDef and ABSurpDef entering the respective models. The 
results for Model (2) in Table 6, Panel A show that the VBSurpDef coefficient is positive and 
significant, indicating that the market prices vested benefit surpluses and deficits. The non-
significant coefficient for VBDEF indicates that the market does not differentiate between 
surpluses and deficits in pricing vested benefits. The negative coefficient for CH1999 is 
significant at the five percent level (one-tailed)  and indicates that firm value is discounted for 
those firms that were taking a contribution holiday in 1999. In contrast to the results for 
vested benefits, the results for Model (3) reported in Table 6 show that although the 
coefficient for ABSurpDef is positive, it is not significant, indicating that accrued benefits are 
not value relevant. However, the significantly negative coefficient for ABDEF suggests that 
the market prices accrued benefit deficits but not surpluses. Contribution holiday (CH1999) is 
again negative and significant in Model (3).  
To verify these results, Models (2) and (3) are re-tested with the sample disaggregated into 
surplus and deficit firm-years. The results presented in Table 6, Panel B show that the 
coefficient for VBSurpDef in Model (2) is negative and significant for the VB Deficit sub-
sample (n=61), and significantly positive for the VB Surplus sub-sample (n=275), confirming 
the previous result that the market prices both vested benefits deficits and surpluses. For 
Model (3), the results show that the coefficient for ABSurpDef is significantly negative for the 
AB Deficit sub-sample (n=82), but not significant for the AB Surplus sub-sample (n=254), 
also confirming the previous result that the market prices accrued benefits deficits, but not 
surpluses. Untabulated diagnostics tests also show that our results are not affected by 
multicollinearity problems, with variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranging between 1.058 and 
3.027 across all regression test results, which are well below the accepted tolerance level of 
10.     
Taken together, these results indicate that vested benefits are considered to be the most 
relevant superannuation measure by the market. The accrued benefits net funding position 
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appears to be relevant only in relation to accrued benefits deficits. An inference that may be 
drawn from this apparent asymmetric treatment of accrued benefits is that while the market 
prices accrued benefit deficits as firms’ liabilities, accrued benefits surpluses are not 
considered to be assets of the firm in the Australian context.   
6. CONCLUSION 
Motivated by the recent worldwide concern about the rapid decline in the funding of defined 
benefit superannuation plans (DBPs), we examine the economic implications of the recent 
changes in DBP funding status for the top-500 Australian listed firms that sponsor DBPs.  An 
examination of superannuation disclosures in their financial reports over a four-year period 
reveals that in 2000 only eight percent of the firms reported accrued benefits deficits, but the 
proportion with deficits increased dramatically to 60% of firms in 2003. The trend in vested 
benefits deficits follows a similar pattern with four percent of the firms reporting deficits in 
2000, rising to 47% in 2003. We also identify that during this period the time lags in 
measuring accrued and vested benefits were significantly shorter for firms with 
superannuation deficits than those with surpluses. Tests of differences between the means of 
the measurement lags in the first two years (2000 & 2001) as compared with the last two 
years (2002 & 2003) of the study period reveal the measurement lags are significantly shorter 
in the last two years for both vested and accrued benefits. The shorter measurement lags for 
firms with superannuation deficits, particularly during the latter two years of the study period, 
suggests that firms tend to disclose more up-to-date information when the superannuation 
funds they sponsor are in deficit, perhaps to try and alleviate investors’ and regulators’ 
concerns about the financial status of DBPs they sponsor. The management response to the 
decline of superannuation funding from surpluses to deficits indicates that the changing 
environment induced more conservative financial reporting, which is consistent with findings 
in the conservatism literature in other contexts (see Watts, 2003a and 2003b).  
Results of regression tests reveal that, when we control for firms taking contribution holidays, 
vested benefits are value relevant, whereas accrued benefits are not. Interestingly, in further 
analysis we find the market prices accrued benefits deficits, but not surpluses, suggesting 
deficits are viewed as liabilities of companies but surpluses are not considered to be assets. 
This asymmetric treatment of accrued benefits deficits and surpluses may indicate a 
conservative bias by market participants and/or a greater response to more relevant and less 
dated information.   
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Asymmetric treatment of firms’ superannuation obligations has implications for recent 
changes to accounting requirements for sponsors of DBPs. AASB 119 now requires firms to 
recognise the accrued benefit surplus (deficit) as an asset (liability). However, unlike the U.S. 
accounting standard SFAS 87, AASB 119 does not require annual measurement of 
superannuation benefit obligations. AASB 119 requires only that defined benefit obligations 
be determined “with sufficient regularity” to ensure “the amounts recognised in financial 
statements do not differ materially from the amounts that would be determined at the 
reporting date” (para.56). In the absence of a more definitive statement, we expect that 
“sufficient regularity” will be interpreted loosely to mean currently accepted practice, which 
is typically triennial valuations. Our findings further show that recognition of amounts that 
are based on dated measures of accrued benefits, are unlikely to improve the quality of the 
superannuation information available to investors. In light of our findings, it is imperative 
that accrued benefits are measured regularly and consistently to ensure that companies’ 
superannuation disclosures are relevant, timely and sufficiently transparent to facilitate 
informed decision-making by investors and other financial report users. 
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Table 1 Sample firm observations by year and industry  
Panel A: Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total  
firm-years 
Gold           3 2 0 1 6 
Other Metals          4 3 4 3 14 
Diversified Resources         4 4 4 4 16 
Energy 8 7 7 6 28 
Infrastructure & Utilities         2 2 1 1 6 
Developers & Contractors        4 4 4 4 16 
Building Materials          6 5 5 5 21 
Alcohol & Tobacco 4 3 2 2 11 
Food & Household Goods        7 6 5 4 22 
Chemicals           4 3 2 1 10 
Engineering         3 1 1 1 6 
Paper & Packaging           2 1 1 1 5 
Retail 4 4 4 3 15 
Transport 2 2 2 2 8 
Media 7 7 7 7 28 
Banks & Finance 7 7 7 7 28 
Insurance        4 3 3 3 13 
Telecommunications    1 1 1 1 4 
Investment & Financial Services 2 2 1 1 6 
Healthcare & Biotechnology     6 6 5 5 22 
Miscellaneous Industrials        4 4 3 3 14 
Diversified Industrials          10 8 6 5 29 
Tourism & Leisure 2 2 2 2 8 
Total 100 87 77 72 336 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (n=336) 
Panel A: Undeflated Data Mean Std. Dev. Minimum First Quartile Median Third Quartile Maximum 
 $m $m $m $m $m $m $m 
Market Capitalisation  5,318.9 9,543.1 14.3 360.6 1,524.7 4,998.0 51,550.1 
Total Assets 19,608.4 57,425.5 16.8 697.1 2,170.7 6,726.9 397,471.0 
Total Liabilities 16,511.8 53,238.9 2.9 301.4 1,190.0 4,022.7 370,260.0 
Total Equity 3,035.9 6,180.2 -1,480.6 270.1 897.1 2,864.3 47,595.0 
Net Income 288.0 1,074.5 -11,962.0 17.0 70.1 299.3 4,313.3 
Accrued Benefits  585.3 1,467.6 1.0 21.5 88.9 291.3 10,516.0 
Vested Benefits 561.7 1,400.3 1.2 22.8 87.2 292.4 10,180.0 
Superannuation Assets 701.7 1,945.2 1.3 24.8 96.3 306.6 15,157.0 
Accrued Benefits Surplus/Deficit 116.5 588.8 -1,293.0 0.0 3.2 18.2 5,246.0 
Vested Benefits Surplus/Deficit 140.7 674.1 -671.0 0.3 4.0 24.6 7,968.9 
Days since accrued benefits measured 
(AB measurement lag) 510 368 0 250 366 731 1461 
Days since vested benefits measured 
(VB measurement lag) 284 268 0 61 275 365 1369 
Panel B: Test Variables – Continuous       
MVE 8.01 8.97 0.05 2.09 4.80 10.77 50.50 
BVEBRS 4.0898 4.5100 -1.3166 1.4370 2.9668 5.0373 31.3893 
NI BRS 0.3604 0.6234 -3.9986 0.1078 0.2734 0.5841 2.9126 
ABSurpDef  0.0750 0.2570 -0.8594 0.0001 0.0124 0.0611 1.7290 
VBSurpDef  0.0951 0.2686 -0.4992 0.0013 0.0165 0.0588 1.6621 
Panel C: Test Variables – Dichotomous      
 Frequencies    
Code  0  1    
 n Percent  n Percent    
LOSS 294 88%  42 13%    
CH1999 170 51%  166 49%    
ABDEF 254 76%  82 24%    
VBDEF 275 82%  61 18%    
All financial test variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding at balance date. Test variables are defined as follows: MVE is the share price four 
months after year end; BVEBRS and NIBRS are the book value of equity and net income respectively, adjusted for any recognised superannuation amounts; 
VBSurpDef  is the vested benefits surplus or deficit and is measured as superannuation plan assets less vested benefits; ABSurpDef  is the accrued benefits surplus or 
deficit and is measured as superannuation plan assets less accrued benefits; LOSS is coded 1 if NIBRS is negative and zero otherwise; CH1999 is coded one if the 
company was taking a contribution holiday in 1999 and zero otherwise; ABDEF is coded 1 for an accrued benefit deficit and zero otherwise; VBDEF is coded 1 
for a vested benefit deficit and zero otherwise.     
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Table 3 Cross-tabulation of frequencies of vested benefits deficits/accrued benefits deficits for 
the years 2000 to 2003 with whether the company was taking a contribution holiday in 1999  
  VBDEF    
Year CH1999 
No 
Deficit Deficit Total χ2-statistic p-value 
2000 0 50 1 51   
 1 46 3 49   
 Total 96 4 100 1.127 0.288 
2001 0 43 1 44   
 1 40 3 43   
 Total 83 4 87 1.097 0.295 
2002 0 31 8 39   
 1 27 11 38   
 Total 58 19 77 0.737 0.391 
2003 0 23 13 36   
 1 15 21 36   
 Total 38 34 72 3.567 0.059 
All years 0 147 23 170   
 1 128 38 166   
 Total 275 61 336 4.954 0.026 
       
  ABDEF    
Year CH1999 
No 
Deficit Deficit Total χ2-statistic p-value 
2000 0 45 6 51   
 1 47 2 49   
 Total 92 8 100 2.004 0.157 
2001 0 40 4 44   
 1 40 3 43   
 Total 80 7 87 0.131 0.717 
2002 0 26 13 39   
 1 27 11 38   
 Total 53 24 77 0.173 0.678 
2003 0 15 21 36   
 1 14 22 36   
 Total 29 43 72 0.058 0.810 
All years 0 126 44 170   
 1 128 38 166   
 Total 254 82 336 0.407 0.523 
 
CH1999 is coded one if the company was taking a contribution holiday in 1999 and zero otherwise; ABDEF is 
coded 1 for an accrued benefit deficit and zero otherwise; VBDEF is coded 1 for a vested benefit deficit and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 4 Tests of differences between the means of benefit measurement time lags and 
observations with deficits  
     Parametric  Non-parametric 
  
No 
Deficit Deficit 
Mean 
difference t-statistic 
p-value 
(two-tailed)  z-statistic 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 ABDEF         
n 254 82       AB 
measurement 
lag Mean 550.4 383.7 166.7 3.4748 0.0007  4.3282 0.0000 
          
 VBDEF         
n 275 61       VB 
measurement 
lag Mean 313.2 149.7 163.5 4.4253 0.0000  4.9692 0.0000 
          
ABDEF is coded 1 for an accrued benefit deficit and zero otherwise; VBDEF is coded 1 for a vested benefit deficit 
and zero otherwise; AB measurement lag is number of days since the date accrued benefits were valued; VB 
measurement lag is number of days since the date vested benefits were valued.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Tests of differences between the means of benefit measurement time lags for years 2000 
& 2001 and 2002 &2003  
     Parametric  Non-parametric 
 Years 2000&2001 2002&2003 
Mean 
difference 
t-
statistic 
p-value 
(two-
tailed)  z-statistic 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
n 187 149       AB 
measurement 
lag Mean 529.5 484.9 44.6 1.0917 0.2758  1.8625 0.0625 
          
n 187 149       VB 
measurement 
lag Mean 312.4 247.4 65.0 2.2260 0.0267  3.0810 0.0021 
 
AB measurement lag is number of days since the date accrued benefits were valued; VB measurement lag is number 
of days since the date vested benefits were valued.  
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Table 6 Pooled regressions of price on book value of equity, earnings and superannuation surplus/deficit  
Panel A: Full Sample     
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficient t-stat
p-value
(one-tailed)  Coefficient t-stat
p-value
(one-tailed)  Coefficient t-stat
p-value 
(one-tailed) 
Intercept  1.589 1.582 0.113  2.210 2.040 0.041  2.302 2.129 0.033 
NI + 6.355 7.914 <0.001      
NIBRS +     6.163 7.672 <0.001  6.299 7.906 <0.001 
LOSS - 0.069 0.074 0.471  0.120 0.216 0.415  0.281 0.305 0.380 
LOSSXNI - -6.791 -5.898 <0.001      
LOSSXNIBRS -     -7.004 -6.073 <0.001  -7.308 -6.352 <0.001 
BVE + 0.887 7.970 <0.001      
BVEBRS +     0.857 7.616 <0.001  0.895 8.008 <0.001 
VBSurpDef    +  2.839 2.272 0.012     
ABSurpDef +         1.525 1.269 0.103 
VBDEF -     -0.159 -0.244 0.437   
ABDEF -      -1.208 -2.071 0.019 
CH1999 -     -1.635 -1.710 0.044  -1.593 -1.679 0.047 
n  336    336    336   
Adj R-square  0.843    0.844    0.846   
F-statistic  18.14    17.89    18.04   
P-value  <0.001    <0.001    <0  .001  
 
 Model (2)  Model (3) 
 VB Deficit  VB Surplus  AB Deficit  AB Surplus 
 Coefficient t-stat 
p-value
(one-
tailed)  Coefficient t-stat
p-value
(one-
tailed)  Coefficient t-stat
p-value
(one-
tailed) Coefficient t-stat
p-value
(one-
tailed)
Intercept 2.685 1.223 0.110  2.437 1.963 0.025  2.033 2.035 0.021 2.299 1.730 0.041
NIBRS 5.558 3.252 <0.001 6.040 7.029 <0.001 5.348 6.079 <0.001 5.633 6.580 <0.001
LOSS 2.705 1.265 0.103 0.015 0.014 0.599 -0.224 -0.222 -0.412 0.342 0.310 0.379
LOSSXNIBRS -7.667 -3.378 <0.001 -6.118 -3.288 <0.001 -5.645 -4.930 <0.001 -5.808 -2.924 0.002
BVEBRS 0.231 1.169 0.121 0.814 6.290 <0.001 0.807 8.173 <0.001 0.959 6.916 <0.001
VBSurpDef    -26.435 -3.368 <0.001  4.339 2.797 0.002  
ABSurpDef   -5.536 -1.984 0.025 2.009 1.129 0.130
CH1999 -2.633 1.223 0.051 -1.576 -1.550 0.060 -0.542 -0.725 0.021 -1.581 -1.371 0.085
n 61    275    82   254  
Adj R-square 0.937    0.853    0.954   0.882  
F-statistic 21.93    16.34    31.59   19.29  
P-value <0.001    <0.001    <0.001   <0.001  
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Table 6 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Sample disaggregated into surplus and deficit firm-years 
 
NIBRS  = Net income adjusted for any recognised superannuation revenue/expense per share 
LOSS  = Coded one if net income is a loss, otherwise zero 
LOSSXNIBRS  = Interaction between LOSS and NIBRS 
BVEBRS  = Book value of equity adjusted for any recognised superannuation items per share 
VBSurpDef     = Vested benefits surplus or deficit and is measured as SNA - VB  
ABSurpDef  = Accrued benefits surplus or deficit and is measured as SNA - AB     
VBDEF = Coded 1 for a vested benefit deficit and zero otherwise 
ABDEF = Coded 1 for an accrued benefit deficit and zero otherwise 
CH1999  = Coded one if the company was taking a contribution holiday in 1999, otherwise zero 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The term ‘pension’ is used in the US and other jurisdictions and is generally equivalent to that of ‘superannuation’ in Australia, 
as both refer to post-employment retirement benefits. 
2 The funding ratio is calculated as pension assets divided by pension obligations, giving an indication of the extent to which 
assets held by the pension plan cover pension liabilities.  
3 Simon Johnson, “Pensions hole to slow UK recovery”, Australian Financial Review, 29 July 2003, p.19.  
4 “Pension deficits: Don’t relax yet”, Accounting & Business, March 2004, p.10.  
5 For example, see George Lekakis “Fund shortfall not so super for Amcor” Australian Financial Review, 29 July 2003, p.19.   
6 This approach permits companies to amortise actuarial gains and losses over the average remaining working lives of defined 
benefit pension plan participants.  
7 The financial reports of the sponsored DBPs must be prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standard AAS 25 
Financial Reporting by Superannuation Plans; see Gallery and Gallery (2004) for a critique of the reporting implications of 
AAS 25.   
8 Vested benefits are members’ legal rights to benefits that are not conditional upon continued superannuation plan membership 
or any factor, other than resignation from the plan (AAS 25, para. 10).  
9 Accrued benefits are benefits the superannuation plan is presently obliged to transfer in the future to members and beneficiaries 
as a result of membership of the plan up to the reporting date (AAS 25, para. 10).   
10 AAS 25 does not prescribe the frequency of actuarial reviews; such requirements are prescribed in legislation. The 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) requires DBPs to have an actuarial review of the plan conducted at 
least every three years.    
11 As the information disclosed in the sponsoring firm’s report is sourced from the superannuation fund’s annual report, at the 
firm’s balance date the most recent fund’s report may be the previous year’s report. The combination of a three-year lag since 
measurement of accrued benefits and sourcing that information from a report that is a year old creates a total four-year lag.     
12 APRA Media Release No. 03-32, 27 March 2003. 
13 ASIC Media and Information Series 03-127, 15 April 2003. 
14 ASIC Media and Information Series 03-263, 21 August 2003. Following this media release, ASIC was accused of “usurping” 
the role of the AASB for insisting on immediate recognition (Fiona Buffini, 2003, “Row over super deficits rule”, Australian 
Financial Review, 4 July, p.3).    
15 AASB Media Release, 27 June 2003. 
16 A survey in 1978 by Francis (1981) of the type of funds sponsored by Australian firms and attitudes to disclosure revealed that 
although a majority of firms sponsored DBPs, there existed a general culture of non-disclosure about these plans. 
17 In contrast to the Australian rules requiring triennial actuarial valuations, SFAS 87 mandates annual valuations that must be 
undertaken no more that three months prior to the firm’s balance date.  
18 Some examples of this type of ‘learning effect’ are discussed in Bernard and Schipper (1994).   
19 See for example Beaver (2002).  
20 See Holthausen and Watts (2001) and Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) for comprehensive reviews of the value-relevance 
literature.  
21 As identified by Gallery (2003).  
22 In contrast to the earlier findings of Barth and Kallapur (1996), Lo (2004) provides recent empirical support for the use of 
deflators in value-relevance research.    
23 The reason for observations with values greater than 365 days is that in some cases companies present information about 
vested benefits that is measured at the same date as the accrued benefits for comparability purposes, and that date could be up 
to four years before the company’s balance date.    
